From Essays After Montaigne
Plutarke saith in some place, that he findes no such great difference betweene beast and beast, as he findeth diversitie betweene man and man. He speaketh of the sufficience of the minde and of internall qualities. Verily I find Epaminondas so farre (taking him as I suppose him) from some that I know (I meane capable of common sense) as I could finde in my heart to endeare upon Plutarke, and say there is more difference betweene such and such a man than there is diversitie betweene such a man and such a beast.
When you will esteeme a man, why should you survey him all wrapt and envelloped? He then but showeth us those parts which are no whit his owne, and hideth those from us by which alone his worth is to be judged. It is the goodnesse of the sword you seeke after, and not the worth of the scabbard; for which peradventure you would not give a farthing if it want his lyning. A man should be judged by himselfe, and not by his complements. And as an Ancient saith very pleasantly: Doe you know wherefore you esteeme him tall? You account the height of his pattens. The base is no part of his stature: measure him without his stilts. Let him lay aside his riches and externall honours, and shew himselfe in his shirt. Hath he a body proper to his functions, sound and cheerefull? What minde hath he? Is it faire, capable and unpolluted, and happily provided with all her necessary parts? Is shee rich of her owne or of others goods? Hath fortune nothing of hers to survey therein? If broad-waking she wil looke upon a naked sword: if shee care not which way her life goeth from her, whether by the mouth or by the throat, whether it be setled, equable, and contented. It is that a man must see and consider, and thereby judge the extreme differences that are betweene us.
Before pondering how best to judge a person, we must decide if it's ever necessary or appropriate to do so. When you're interviewed to serve on a jury (in New York City at least), you're first asked whether you believe that it's your right to judge another person or you believe that right is reserved for God alone. For Christians, the appropriate answer to that question seems obvious: "Judge not, that ye be not judged." But I think that asking potential jurors the question in that context blurs an important distinction that may already be hopelessly obscured in our society: the distinction between judging a person and judging a person's actions (and even intentions). For instance, a jury deciding that it has been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant killed another person with premeditation (which, without devolving to sophistry, is an objective question) in contravention of existing laws is not violating Jesus' instructions. It need not judge the person to render its decision. Juries are carefully chosen and instructed to render an opinion on the facts of the case--they're not asked to judge the defendant. Unfortunately, once the foreperson announces the jury's verdict, especially if it's in favor of the state, it becomes personal. The defendant becomes a guilty man or woman, and for the rest of his or her life is a convict. The system moves quickly from its proper role of determining the legality of his or her actions to judging and defining him or her as a person. But that, which could be seen as exceeding the authority of humans and their institutions, happens only after the jury is no longer involved.
So even in an instance in which we're called upon to sit in judgment of others, we should be judging not them, but their actions. Yet our need to judge others seems fundamental, and it will find expression one way or another. Despite its rich secular history, ours is among the most judgmental of cultures. Most of us jealously guard our freedom of speech not to engage in spirited and meaningful discussions of ideas, but to be sure that we will always be able to inflict our opinion, no matter how superficial or ill-informed, on anyone and everyone. Our most popular form of entertainment just now is to watch amateurs sing and then offer our collective national judgment on their performances, and this is little more than a technologically advanced combination of sports fans arguing over how a game should have ended and why it didn't end that way, spectators commenting on the happenings at one of the nearly endless examples of award shows, and Mystery Science Theater 3000. By some deeply flawed application of a pedagogical version of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle (whereby measuring what students know is more important than teaching them what they don't know), education has gone from a process of conveying knowledge to those who don't have it to one of ranking and culling on the basis of innate ability. And as anyone who has spent much time browsing Weblogs can attest, we've even devolved to compulsively judging and defining ourselves.
But nowhere is the impulse to traffic in personal judgment more dangerously apparent than in the current discourse surrounding our foreign policy. The administration hasn't publicly made any distinction between the specific, often complicated decisions made by foreign officials and the moral sentiment of the populations that they represent. Nor does it appear to see the difference between those officials' self-interested actions and their judgments of the United States, just as it seems not to allow for the distinction between legitimate dissension and treason--and the actions it takes as a result look transparent and inept. This course of conduct is unlikely to meet with any real success in the complex realm of international diplomacy, where wars and presidencies are viewed as mere events, and events from decades and even centuries ago are as real and relevant as current events. (Five years ago, foreign diplomats knew nothing of George W. Bush, and five years hence, they are likely to have forgotten most of what they've learned. Let's hope that they don't forget the notion of effective American diplomacy along with him.)
Worse still, what opposition there has been to the administration's policies has tended to take the same personal form, demonizing individuals rather than criticizing actions. It's not necessary to elaborate a Byzantine conspiracy behind a decision in order to demonstrate that it's mistaken. The decision to unilaterally and preemptively attack Iraq was wrong not because our current administration aspires to empire or is seeking to enrich its supporters, but because it didn't address any existing threat, it significantly decreased our diplomatic standing in the world, and it undermined the international institutions and laws that we were instrumental in creating. A large segment of our population feels a deep respect for our country and the office of the President as institutions, and emotional attacks on either of them (as amusing as such attacks may be) are unlikely to convince those people (who can and should be convinced) that we've taken a wrong turn. We will be given an opportunity to render our findings on the actions of this administration after another year and a half of deliberation. Let's use that time to carefully establish and consider the facts of the case so that our nation as a whole will be in a position to reach its verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.
7:35:08 AM 
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