Three hours after the hostage standoff at Platte Canyon High School ended, that seems to be the vexing question: Why did the cops move in?
I'm listening to talk radio here in Denver, and there is a lot of speculation about what was going on in that classroom to cause the cops to charge in. Some high-profile hosts and some of there guests are suggesting that the SWAT maneuver was a risky move, meaning that there was probably more happening than we now know about. I'm not going to repeat the rumors being bandied about, but there are plenty.
Yow. Those are some terrible questions to contemplate, and they are definitely burning for me tonight: What was happening in that classroom, and what calculation was made? Of the two hostages at the time, we now know that one survived without injury, one died. That's a terrible price, but it might have been twice as bad.
At this point, we don't know, but we are wondering.
As for other risk factors . . . I wonder. If you've read much about hostage negotiation, you'll know that this gunman was exhibiting very high risk factors already. I've spent a lot of time researching these situations for my Columbine book. I've also spent a great deal of time with retired FBI Agent Dwayne Fuselier, who led the Columbine investigation for the bureau. He is also one of the country's leading experts on hostage negotiation.
Before he came to Colorado, he worked in the FBI's special hostage unit near Washington. His team studied a large number of critical incidents from around the country and drew several conclusions. His work is widely cited in scholarly work in the field, as well as the FBI's field manuals. You can see a really great document from the FBI here (Fuselier is cited, but not the author):
It's called 'Negotiation Concepts for Commanders,' and it was published in the 'FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin,' in January 1999 (three months before Columbine.) It's available to anyone online as a PDF. It runs just nine pages, and it's written in a style that's easy for a layman to understand.
The crucial first question a negotiator faces, it stresses, is answering a deceptively simple question: Is this a hostage situation or non-hostage situation? That may sound too obvious to even mention, but it's not always as obvious as it may sound, and the consequences are crucial. All the suggested actions branch off from the answer to that question.
Today's situation sounds like an obvious hostage situation, but it actually has some of the trademarks of non-hostage. Consider these passage from the piece, starting on p. 7 (the second page of the piece--it begins on p. 6 of the journal. Also note that I use ellipses in order to give you a quick taste. I'm not editing to suit a particular line of thinking, just for brevity. I urge you to follow the link yourself):
'During hostage situations, subjects hold another person or persons for the purpose of forcing the fulfillment of substantive demands upon a third party, usually law enforcement. . . . Hostage-takers demonstrate goal-oriented and purposeful behavior. . . . The primary goal is not to harm the hostages. In fact, hostage takers realize that only through keeping the hostages alive can they hope to achieve their goals.
In nonhostage incidents, individuals act in an emotional, senseless, and often-self-destructive way. . . They are motivated by anger, rage, frustration, hurt, confusion or depression. They have no clear goals and often exhibit purposeless, self-defeating behavior.' They typically issue no demands, because 'What they want is what they already have, the victim. . . . The potential for homicide followed by suicide in many of these cases if very high.'
Still convinced we were dealing with a hostage situation? In reality, there were hostages. But from a negotiators' point of view, trying to comprehend and predict how his gunman is likely to react, he has to see past the obvious and I think he/she probably realized this afternoon that the gunman was exhibiting classic non-hostage-taker traits.
According to the Park County Sheriff's descriptions, the gunman was acting erratically and appeared to have no clear idea what he wanted to accomplish. He did not appear to seize the hostages with an agenda, but in some sort of desperation. Desperate people tend to do desperate things. Or as the FBI piece puts it, 'The potential for homicide followed by suicide in many of these cases if very high.'
The outcome bears that out: homicide followed by suicide is exactly what happened. Of course the SWAT team bursting into the room may have provoked that--or it might have just accelarated it. Not everyone responds to an attack by shooting the victim, much less killing himself. The fact that he did bolsters the probability that he had been erratic all along, and headed in that direction.
Consider also, how the negotiations were progressing. The same FBI piece cites eleven criteria for assessing progress. It states:
The following indicators signify progress and generally mean that current negotiation initiatives should continue. Specifically, since negotiations have begun:
- no additional deaths or injuries have resulted,
- the subject has reduced threats and is using less violent language,
- the subject's emotions have lowered,
- the subject has exhibited increased rationality in speech and action,
- deadlines have passed [Note from Dave. This one can be confusing; I believe it means that deadlines imposed by the subject have passed, without incident]
- the subject has become increasingly willing to bargain,
- the subject has lowered demands,
- the subject has released a hostage,
- the negotiator has built a rapport with the subject,
- the subject has made positive statements about the welfare of the hostage/victim and/or
- the subject has asked about the consequences of surrendering.
We don't have all the information yet, but from the sheriff's press conference, it sounded like only two of those eleven criteria had been met--the most basic two: letting hostages go and refraining from murder. And he had stopped releasing hostages and was giving an ultimatum, so progress there seems to have ended, too. All the other warning signs look pretty bleak, in this case.
If you start with the awareness that a situation like this begins with a high risk of murder/suicide, and then the gunmen fails to exhibit almost any of the indicators that suggest a diffusion . . .
Well, I guess I'd challenge the notion that there would have to have been more risk factors for a prudent commander to order an attack. I'll defer an opinion until I know more, because there is a great deal we don't know.
What I really suggest is that once we do know more, there may be a whole lot of screaming and yelling about it. And the command team's decisions may look wise or they may look foolish. But let's look at them with educated eyes. Just a few pages of reading on hostage-negotiation situations could clarify a great deal. It's just nine pages. Consider reading it.
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(Meanwhile, I feel like hell. This sure dredges up a lot of awful memories. I'm sure it's a hundred times worse for the people I've been working with the past seven years.)
Dutton (Penguin) in early 2009. 
