Thursday, April 29, 2004

What does American Defeat in Iraq Look Like Here is what American defeat looks like:   From The Associated Press   "The plan is that the whole of Fallujah will be under the control of the FPA," which will be subordinate to the Marines, Byrne said, calling the deal "an Iraqi solution to an Iraqi problem." Byrne identified the commander only as Gen. Salah, a former division commander under Saddam. A Lt. Gen. Salah Abboud al-Jabouri, a native of the Fallujah region, served as governor of Anbar province under Saddam and was a senior commander in his military. It seems likely that some of the insurgent gunmen in the city — mainly criminals, who fought Americans for money, and some disgruntled ex-soldiers, though not hard-liners or Islamic fighters — would likely end up as part of the force, a Marine officer said on condition of anonymity. " I firmly support the peaceful end of the siege of Fallujah, because there never was a reason for the U.S. to attack the city in the first place.   The American defeat here represents a defeat of the Neocons who have been itching to prove that there is a military solution to every problem.   They could not make the case for the Iraq war on the scale of Vietnam, with 500,000 troops, which would be necessary to pacify and occupy a country like Iraq.  This is the level of troops, on a per capita basis, that is currently on the ground in Bosnia and Kosovo, more than 5 years after the conflict.   So they tried to impose their military solution on the cheap, with massive fire power, smart bombs, and relatively few troops.  This works when you have a military objective—such as toppling Saddam Hussein.  But it doesn’t work when you have a political objective:  helping a stable, democratic Iraq to emerge.   There is every reason to think a stable Iraq can emerge—only it is not likely to be what the Neocon’s wanted.  Instead it is likely to be a Islamic democratic theocracy, similar to Iran, with possibly some breakaway provinces which are autonomous, or virtually independent in all but name.   The emergence of this type of Iraq will be seen throughout the region as a defeat for the U.S., which now appears to be trying to install elements of the old regime for their usefulness in controlling the Iraqi population.   Imagine if George Bush, on landing on the aircraft carrier a year ago, had said:  “This is the beginning of one year of war, after which we will turn control of Fallujah over to General Salah Abboud al Jabouri, who was governor of Anbar province under Saddam Hussein.”   “At the same time, we will encourage General Salah to integrate many of the guerrilla fighters into his army, so that they become part of the security solution in Fallujah.  U.S. troops will then return to their bases.”   This is not an unreasonable outcome, but it is not the outcome the Neocons sacrificed over 700 American soldiers to achieve.   The American defeat in Iraq will come from overreaching—from thinking the U.S. had the will and the power to impose scoundrels like Ahmed Chalabi as “soft dictators” who would enforce a type of disguised U.S. control in return for permission to loot the wealth of Iraq.   Fallujah represents a turning point in Iraq as important as Tet was in Vietnam.  It defined the limits of American power, and set the U.S. on a course of retreat.  Once in retreat, the U.S. loses much of its ability to control events, as is now happening.   It will take a long time for us to begin to absorb the consequences of this defeat.  But one will surely be a further retreat from the Arab world, a weakening of the U.S. position as a hegemonic power, and it will likely hasten the rise of economic and political rivals such as China, who now have more opportunities to pursue their strategic objectives with less regard for U.S. opposition.   By trying to make war on a tactic like terrorism, which is about as sensible as declaring war on the color “blue”, the U.S. has seriously weakened itself.  Will our leaders be held truly accountable? Probably not in this generation.    The defeats in Vietnam and Iraq effectively weaken the ability of the U.S. to export social problems to other countries.  Now we will have to face with our own resources the costs of an aging population, an overextended work force, and two generations of misplaced priorities.  Instead of investing in wealth building activities like education, research, and healthy populations, we have squandered our wealth on military adventures and have little to show for it except another defeat.   It is becoming increasingly untenable for the U.S. to continue to consume such a disproportionate share of the world’s resources, and the outcome of the terrible choice to fight a shadow war in Iraq will lead to lower living standards for our children and grandchildren. 5:35:52 PM   comment []

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