The mechanism is also a source of corruption, but that is
not the subject of this post. Suffice it to say that Venezuela has bought more
than US$ 6 billion in Argentinean bonds, which have been sold to “some” local
financial institutions with no transparency whatsoever. In Guisonomics part
I, I showed how bad these transactions are for Venezuela, as it becomes a
subsidy to richer Argentina (per capita) and it would be more efficient and
cheaper for the Government to simply sell dollars into the local swap market.
A separate mechanism has been for Venezuela to issue dollar
denominated bonds, but sold in local currency, as a way of selling “cheaper” US
dollars to locals, relieving the pressure in the parallel swap market.
As I have explained before, this mechanism has limitations,
as there is not infinite appetite for Venezuela’s debt abroad and as more and
more issues have come to market, it has become more expensive for Venezuela to
issue more debt. The reason is simple, while Venezuela’s debt is small relative
to its GDP, the lack of transparency, Chavez’ economic policies and
nationalizations has made investors demand a higher interest in order to buy
the country’s bonds. The number of interested investors is also limited.
Higher interest implies lower prices for the country’s bonds
and obviously, it is more expensive for the country to borrow money. It took a
while for the Chavez administration to realize this. In March of last year, a long-term
bond (’27) from Venezuela would yield a little bit under 7%, but after the
issuance of US$ 7.5 billion in PDVSA bonds and more bonds this year (and the US
subprime crisis), the same bond yields 10.4% these days. In the end, it’s a self-fulfilling
prophecy, if fund managers in the US expect more bonds to come out, they will
wait for them to come out and buy them cheaper (or higher yielding!)
In May, the Venezuelan Government issued US$ 4 billion more
in new bonds and people at the Ministry of Finance realized that if they issued
more any time soon, they would drive prices even lower. And that is not good for the country
or its people.
And what is bad for Venezuelans can’t be good for
Argentineans, no?
Well, instead of screwing up Venezuela’s debt, we went and
announced that Venezuela would by an additional US$ 1 billion in Argentina’s
debt, because as I mentioned yesterday, Chavez said, “We have great trust in
Argentineans”.
Which is a huge lie…
Because what the Venezuelan Government does is simply turn
around and sell them to local financial institutions, who turn around and sell
them really fast to funds in New York, with a lot of money made in the process.
Thus, what Venezuela does to its Argentinean “buddies” is
exactly what it does not want to do to its own bonds: Flood the markets with
them so that prices go down and yields move up.
Except that Argentina is in much worse shape than Venezuela
and its bonds had to pay 15% last week for someone to buy them (Venezuela)…
Until today…
Because today the Venezuelan Government decided to sell more
than the usual of the Argentinean bonds. The reason has not been given, but it is probably
that there has been more demand in the parallel swap market since the
nationalization of Banco de Venezuela was announced. Thus, the supply of Argentinean
bonds in the New York market became a deluge (some traders said it was raining Argentienan bonds in New York) and Argentinean bond prices
plummeted today. Below I show the price and yield of the Boden 15, which is
what Chavez bought this week.