In an essay penned recently under the nominative heading of an "Environment of Surfaces," writer Art Jacobson at Ojo Caliente posits an operational view of human existence that seems to describe, or state, a mode of being separated from the common or generally accepted notion of being as an expression of intentionality.

By "operational," I mean that an "environment," as Jacobson forwards the idea, is a theater in which one performs certain actions; admittedly, all actions are locative with respect to environment—even such ephemera as becoming angry, or recollecting—but it is more typical to structure statements of fact around actions than it is to formulate statements of fact around the places in which they occur. Objections to this assertion are envisionable, certainly, but would take the form of pointing out that in specific cases the rule of typicality is violated, which indirectly reinforces the stated assertion.

In directing our attention toward environment, Jacobson's argument appears to derive its force from a metaphorical interplay between subject and idea, i.e., an environment is a surface whether substantive or not, and all actions and intentions are conducted on physical surfaces or carried out in some relation to physical surfaces, such that a comparison between location and the depth (or lack of depth) of intentionality is altogether natural and one that most persons might be expected to consider at some point or another.

Before exploring the idea of a surfacial environment of operations further, however, an examination of the idea of surfaces is in order. When we use such expressions as "a surface-level argument," or "how things look on the surface," we seem to be treading on the same ground as covered by such terms as "face-value," and "superficial," which indicate that reality may be sometimes masked in some way, like an actor might don a mask or disguise, and that to take overt appearances for reality is to do more than make a simple mistake: it is to express such gullibility as to make one morally culpable for the consequences of the deception. Indeed, someone who takes all things at their implied value based on surface appearances is likely to be guilty of self-deception. This idea is encapsulated in the admonition to "not judge a book by its cover," and also by the observation that "beauty is more than skin deep." These aphorisms suggest a conventional understanding that we have a responsibility to question appearances and perform critical evaluations on any representation of fact; this injuction holding for both apprehensive phenomena (looking, touching, etc.) and declarative statements including speeches, works of art, measurements, evaluations and so on. One idea expressed by the word "criticize," especially as with "art critic," "film critic," and so on is that things contain deeper meanings that can (and should) be explored deeply in order for us to fully understand them.

If, then, we are to regard exterior appearance (i.e., surfaces) as propositions only until proved otherwise, then the declaration that we live in an environment of surfaces is tantamount to nihilism inasmuch as it negates the potential of living in a world of perceived symbolism. In the area of the philosophy of language, the view that words can represent reality in an inherent sense and contain empirical meaning is termed essentialism, and this school of thought has been, if not discredited by modern philosophers, at least subjected by them to a serious and long-running assault.

All of this seems to be a laborious way of getting around to the idea that we do not live in a world purely of surface value, but rather a world of implications, and here I would like to suggest that in effect we are living in an environment of operations. By "operation," I mean that we act in various ways, either independently or in response to other actions taking place around us. For example, a person who is feeling anxiety may eat in a given instance not because he or she is hungry but because eating is comforting. The surface appearance is that this person is eating, but the underlying truth is that the action of eating is synonymous with any calming or restorative act and should be so interpreted. What we are viewing is an operation and a full comprehension of the act requires a grasp of the operation being conducted.

Another example worth considering is satire. In the sarcastic mode, as with Jonathan Swift's Modest Proposal, the surfacial implication of the work is intended to direct our attention to the fact that its apparent meaning is in fact the opposite of what is being stated—children should be cared for and not eaten. And in considering language, which is a purely symbolic form of representation, we can conclude that the arbitrary symbols we use to communicate with one another are capable of holding any meaning warranted by the circumstances of their use, which is another way of saying that language is imbued with meaning by the operation it is intended to accomplish.

5:02:43 PM