Selling Our Secrets
By WILLIAM SAFIRE

They never learn.

Remember, a couple of years ago, the scandals about the way corporate giants like Hughes Electronics and Loral Space, led by big Democratic contributors, sold secret U.S. satellite technology to Chinese aerospace companies and semiconductor manufacturers?

...the Bush administration is getting ready to let our ever-hungry multinationals do the same thing. This time, however, it would all be legalized. If current legislation (Senate 149, the Export Administration Act) being urged by the White House passed, American executives would be encouraged to sell the fruits of their most advanced research to foreign nationals who may not wish us well.    [...]

In general, I don't pay a lot of attention to international trade legislation.  Its not that I consider it unimportant, I just find it mind-boggingly boring.  I don't do a whole lot better with economics in general.  I'm much more of an abstract issues person, not a concerete numbers person.  Despite all of this, even *I* remember the flap about our companies selling technology to Chinese companies.  It was big, it was loud and it was one more thing used to demonstrate the horrific immorality of the Clinton administration.

I must give Mr. Safire credit, at least he admits it's no better when the Bush administration does it than when the Clinton administration did.

This is one area, though, where those abstract issues and concrete numbers do intersect. The issue is our safety.  The numbers are profits. And in this case it appears that profits trump safety, even though the administration has shown repeatedly that our civil rights don't.  This law would allow companies to sell technology to customers around the world, many of whom are free to turn around and resell it to our enemies.  As Safire notes:

Iraq buys dual-use nuclear components through cutouts who could easily buy them from us. Take high-strength aluminum tubes, for example, which can be used in bicycles — but a thousand of them in easily hidden gas centrifuges can produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one nuclear bomb every year. Under the proposed law, a country like Russia or Jordan could buy ours and re-sell them to Saddam with no weapons inspectors the wiser.

You like the composite glass fibers in your tennis racquet? A sinister use is to form the rotors of those centrifuges, and their export has been controlled for 20 years. No more, if those who would sell our technology to multifarious middlemen have their way.

So, if our homeland security is so important that twenty people have to be detained because one of them has a name on a "no-fly" list, why isn't it important enough to maintain controls on the export of goods that could be used by our enemies - by Iraq, for example -  to harm or kill unknown numbers of our citizens?

No-fly blacklist snares political activists

Alan Gathright, Chronicle Staff Writer

A federal "No Fly" list, intended to keep terrorists from boarding planes, is snaring peace activists at San Francisco International and other U. S. airports, triggering complaints that civil liberties are being trampled.

And while several federal agencies acknowledge that they contribute names to the congressionally mandated list, none of them, when contacted by The Chronicle, could or would say which agency is responsible for managing the list.

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, many different pieces of legislation and many new rules have been instituted to try and add to the security of this country.  There has also been a great deal of debate, as it often seems that the lawmakers, and John Ashcroft in particular, are willing to have citizens sacrifice a number of their freedoms in the interest of "safety".  Personally, I'd rather live with a certain level of risk and retain my freedoms, as do most others, I imagine - though where exactly that "certain level" falls becomes an issue of serious debate.

The article quoted above refers to a "No-Fly List" that was instituted in the wake of the attacks.  The list is apparently "held" (though not "managed") by the Transportation Security Adminostration, and many agencies, including the FBI, CIA and NSA are able to add names to it as they see fit -- though none of them have been particularly willing to acknowledge if they have.

The purpose of the list was to keep a record of names of potential terrorists or other criminals, but in the last several months, a number of anti-war activists have also been denied or delayed in their air travel plans because their name was either on the list or "resembled" a name on the list (it seems no one is even willing to say for certain which it is). 

Part of what concerns me is that no only does it appear that there is no one who is actually accountable for maintaining, vetting or resolving problems in regards to the list, but the guidelines as to who is considered to be enough of a risk to be added to the list also seems to be an unknown.  If someone is being delayed or detained because of this list, then they should have the right to know 1) if, in fact, they are actually ON the list or if it is a matter of their name strongly resembling that of someone on the list, 2) why their name was put on the list and 3) who put their name on the list.  In addition, they should also have the right to rebut the claim that they are a risk, and there should be some kind of recourse for them if they feel they have been listed unfairly.

Five months ago, a group of anti-war protesters from Wisconsin were delayed because the name of one member of the group was either on the list or resembled a name on the list.  Twenty people were detained, but only one of those 20 was even allegedly on the list - a classic case of "guilt by association". That the woman in question was a 74-year-old Catholic nun made no difference, and the article notes that because the group respects that there needs to be tighter security after what has happened, they did not make much of a fuss at the time.  But even now, 5 months after the incident, they still cannot find out any information about how her name got on the list, who put it there, why it was put there or anything else.

With no accountability, no difinitive source of origin, no established guidelines for inclusion or anything else of that nature, this list can be used not only to try and help prevent suspected terrorists or other criminals from getting on planes, but it can also be used to help make it more difficult for protesters who disagree with what the government wants to carry out the excercising of their freedom of speech.  That, in my opinion, is unacceptable.  If the government wants to maintain watch lists or "no-fly" lists, fine.  Do it out in such a way that if someone is on a list they can find out why and how; give them the ability to challenge their inclusion; and establish some guidelines as to what qualifies someone to be considered a potential terrorist or criminal. To do any less leaves it far too open to abuse, and no administration need access to something like that.