Butler report slams intelligence, not Blair
Lord Butler's report
into the pre-war intelligence on Iraq has just been released. The inquiry is
critical of the procedures of UK intelligence services, but essentially
aquits Tony Blair from charges that he misused or misrepresented intelligence. I foresee another series of "whitewash" allegations. Link: The Lord Butler report. Update 1: Here is what the Butler report says on uranium from Niger:
45. From our examination of the
intelligence and other material on Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from
Africa, we have concluded that:
a. It is accepted by all parties that Iraqi officials visited Niger in 1999.
b.
The British Government had intelligence from several different sources
indicating that this visit was for the purpose of acquiring uranium.
Since uranium constitutes almost three-quarters of Niger’s exports, the
intelligence was credible.
c. The evidence was not conclusive that Iraq actually purchased, as opposed to having sought, uranium and the British Government did not claim this.
d. The forged documents were not available to the British Government at
the time its assessment was made, and so the fact of the forgery does
not undermine it. (Paragraph 503)
Update 2: The Butler report says British intelligence found evidence of contacts, but not
cooperation between Saddam and al-Qaeda (note: it is spelled al-Qaida in
the report). The JIC was quite prescient about future threats in Iraq,
though, when it warned against terrorists flocking into Iraq already on
March 12, 2003
Reporting since [February] suggests that senior Al Qaida associate Abu
Musab alZarqawi has established sleeper cells in Baghdad,to be
activated during a US occupation of the city. These cells apparently
intend to attack US targets using car bombs and other weapons. (It is
also possible that they have received CB materials from terrorists in
the KAZ.) Al Qaida-associated terrorists continued to arrive in Baghdad
in early March.
Update 3: It now appears unlikely that Saddam Hussein had actual stockpiles of WMDs, Lord Butler concludes, but the Iraqi regime a.
Had the strategic intention of resuming the pursuit of prohibited
weapons programmes, including if possible its nuclear weapons
programme, when United Nations inspection regimes were relaxed and
sanctions were eroded or lifted. b.
In support of that goal, was carrying out illicit research and
development, and procurement, activities, to seek to sustain its
indigenous capabilities. c.
Was developing ballistic missiles with a range longer than permitted
under relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions; but did not
have significant - if any - stocks of chemical or biological weapons in
a state fit for deployment, or developed plans for using them.
(Paragraph 474). Update 4: On the popular "war for oil" argument, the report says (579): It
has frequently been alleged that the real motivation behind the
decision to go to war in Iraq was a desire to control Iraq’s oil
supplies. This issue does not fall within our terms of reference and we
did not take evidence specifically on it. We did, however, review
JIC assessments on the security of oil supplies issued in the period
2000-2003, in which such a motivation did not feature. We also think it
improbable that such an objective or motivation, if it existed, would
not have been apparent in the large volume and wide range of policy and
intelligence papers that we examined. We saw no evidence that a motive
of the British Government for initiating military action was securing
continuing access to oil supplies. Outside the tin foil hat/Michael Moore crowd, this will hardly be controversial.
1:59:20 PM 
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