Monday, March 31, 2003

For what it’s worth The following are snippets from an interview with Gen. Merrill A. "Tony" McPeak, retired former chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force.   Very interesting… once again, I’d like to see Bush’s media goon-squads try and paint this guy as part of the “librul media.”   Don’t miss the comments about us starting a century-long occupation. Or the comments relating to adults in the white house…   (thanks to TPM)   Diplomatic failures concern to retired U.S. commander 03/27/03 JEFF MANNING and NORM MAVES JR.   …McPeak, who headed the Air Force during the first Iraq war and now lives in Lake Oswego, said the United States will pay a political price for the Bush administration's "maladroit" diplomatic efforts in the region. Turkey's refusal to become a staging ground for the U.S. military hampered war plans, and he predicted a long and turbulent U.S. occupation of Iraq and perhaps other countries in the region.   "We've been in Europe now since 1945. We've been in Japan since 1945, been in Korea since 1950," said McPeak, one of the United States' most outspoken retired generals. "We haven't had a Middle East occupation force, so this is a start of that. This is the way great powers operate; it's the way Rome operated."   McPeak's provocative views don't end there. He said it makes little sense to take over Iraq while a much more vital problem -- North Korea's developing nuclear capability -- is allowed to fester.   "This is a problem of global military significance," he said of North Korea. "Iraq is a regional problem."   Here is a condensed and edited version of the conversation Wednesday with McPeak:   What are your impressions on the first week of the war?   There are some things that surprised me a little bit. One is, as a consequence of the political clumsiness, we do not have the help of Turkey and Saudi Arabia. They should have been on our side from the beginning. It's our fault they're not, in my opinion.…   So is there anything working in the Iraqis' favor?   What they've got going for them is that our maladroitness politically and diplomatically has put us in a real bind. There is no doubt in my mind that Saddam Hussein is an unpopular guy in Iraq, but he's running against George Bush. If you're an Iraqi, you've gotta decide who you're going to vote for here.   …After the worst of Iraq is over, do you anticipate that the Bush administration will launch military action against North Korea?   My guess is that we will very quickly agree to bilateral talks. What I would expect is as soon as we can gracefully do it, hand off Iraq to some sort of military-slash-civilian administration; then Washington will be ready to turn to the next problem, which is Korea.   It's a bandwidth problem in Washington. It can only deal with one thing at a time.   The bad part is, the fuse is burning. The (nuclear material) processing is going to be difficult for the Koreans to do and so forth, but (North Korea) has nuclear weapons already, or they're quite close to it.   We have to get involved in that. And my view is that there's at least some possibility that the timelines of what we're doing in Iraq are not being driven by the Iraq problem, but by the Korean problem.   You think Korea poses the more serious threat to peace?   Oh, yeah. First of all, this is a problem of weapons of mass destruction. Unquestionably. Don't have to be a genius to figure that out. Second, they're at the nexus of great power politics -- the Chinese have a border; the Russians have a short border. Japan's there. We're there. I mean if this is not a strategic part of the world, what the hell are we doing with 40,000 troops (in South Korea)?   So this is a problem of global strategic significance. Any way you look at it, Iraq is a regional problem, and it's an important problem, it ties to a lot of other problems, but it's a regional problem. If I were helping the president decide what we ought to work on today, I would have put Korea ahead of Iraq.   The other reason I would have put it ahead is I don't think we have anything like a strategy for the Middle East. (This) has all the aspects of a kind of a slapdash pickup fight. You always call audibles in war, but we're drawing the plays on the ground in the huddle. We don't have a playbook.   There is an argument here, which is that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological and nuclear know-how . . . that the Iraqi government could give these weapons to somebody that's willing to use them, which could wreak pretty serious consequences on the world. Do you buy that?   This reminds me of the story about the guy who said, If I had some ham, I'd make a ham sandwich, if I had some bread.   If (Saddam) has munitions of mass destruction, and a decent and a working relationship with al-Qaida, and al-Qaida can figure out how to deliver it in downtown New York City.   I'm not saying it's a nonthreat. In fact it's an important threat, and one we have to figure out how to deal with without having the FBI listen to every one of our cell phone conversations.   But Saddam, if he has munitions of mass destruction, we haven't found it yet. I mean it's laughable to think he has the delivery capability that can reach outside the region.   And he's a secular guy. He's not an Islamic fundamentalist, by any means. Now his back's to the wall in downtown Baghdad. If he's got them, I expect him to use them against our guys, i.e., a regional use.   The Korean case is entirely different. There's no doubt about the weapons of mass destruction. They do have delivery (means?) and can reach out and hit great powers, including U.S. territory with these weapons.   …Does the diplomatic situation in Turkey and Saudi Arabia have other ramifications?   These countries have hit on the problem of legitimacy. What is a legitimate use of American power? This is an overarching problem, that's going to be with us for a long time. I mean we all pray that we'll be the premier world power for centuries.   For whatever reason, the Turks and the Saudis have decided that this is not a legitimate use of power. By the way, they appear to be in the majority worldwide. I believe that one of the elements of power is the ethical and moral authority that is conferred on forces when their use is seen to be legitimate. It's as important as bullets, in my opinion.   When we started bombing Kosovo, everybody in the world saw that -- how painful that decision was. They knew we weren't there to make Kosovo the 51st state; they knew we didn't go into Afghanistan to put George Bush's face on the money there. When we act with legitimacy, it gives our military actions a source of strength. I mean for me this is an aspect of the political maladroitness. I mean you just have to say that you wonder if there's anybody in the White House that's an educated adult.   But the administration would argue that, in the age of terror, unilateralism is valid, and we can't wait for another Pearl Harbor to make this war legitimate in the eyes of the world.   In my judgment, you can fight a war on terrorism and do it legitimately (and) do it without sacrificing civil liberties in the United States, but it requires a certain intelligence and sophistication be brought to the table.   So maybe we ought to start grading presidential candidates for an IQ. Although it's hard to see why anybody that's very smart would want to run.   …Is there an alternative to urban warfare in Baghdad?   We could put Baghdad under siege and sit on the outside.   Would you really think so three years down the road, with stories from Baghdad of people dead and emaciated kids?   Yes. The impact on world opinion is an argument against that approach. It's an argument for finishing this thing quickly. But, nevertheless, it's a decision we can make. And we've already made decisions that said, 'World opinion's not very important to us.'   Is Iraq the last country we confront in the Middle East?   Who wants to volunteer to get cross-ways with us? We'll be there a century, hopefully. If it works right.   I'll tell you one thing we should not hope for (is) a democratic Iraq. When I hear the president talking about democracy, the last thing we should want is an election in Iraq. We're not very popular. So I don't think we'll see any open elections in Iraq for a long time.   Hopefully over time they can be brought along like Japan and Germany -- Japan and Germany were relatively easy, I think, and South Korea. 4:05:14 PM

False claims documented This is just a short snippet of a much longer article that lists many of the “mistaken’ claims made on behalf of the coalition that over time have proven to be false.   These “mistakes” have oftentimes occurred at propitious times, distracting news coverage from less upbeat “news.” Also these “mistakes” often follow one on the other so that as one is disproved another “rumor” is already up and running in the news cycle.   Make sure to click on the article to see sheer numbers “misinformed” stories – all favorable to Bush/Blair – that have occurred.   (thanks to the agonist)   War Watch: Claims and counter claims made during the media war over Iraq Annie Lawson, Lisa O'Carroll, Chris Tryhorn, Jason Deans Monday March 31, 2003   "Fog" is the watchword of this war, with the lines between fact and propaganda being blurred on a daily basis.   The demands of round-the-clock news means military claims are being relayed instantly to millions without being confirmed or verified only to be refuted later by reporters on the ground or by fresh military updates.   In due course, questions will be asked about the clashing interests of the military and the media and the role of war propaganda in the pursuit of a swift victory against Saddam's regime.   An early example of false claims relates to the battle to take control of Umm Qasr, the southern Iraqi deep-sea port and one of the key targets in the early war.   By the first weekend of the conflict, it had been reported "taken" nine times, despite continued ugly skirmishes between coalition forces and irregulars loyal to Saddam Hussein operating out of the old town. Umm Qasr was not, in fact, taken until three days later.   Today a British military spokesman was forced to concede the Iraqi general they had picked up yesterday was "just another officer" and was "misidentified as a general". It is the third time a general's scalp has been misclaimed. Last week Radio 5 Live discussed the capture of a general at length, while on March 24th (see surrender of 51st infantry division below) the military had to concede that a 'commander' of the surrendered troops was actually a junior officer masquerading as a higher-ranking official in an attempt "to win better treatment."   Here MediaGuardian.co.uk charts the contradictory claims and counter claims made so far.   Anyone who can point to other war claims that don't bear scrutiny, please email editor@mediaguardian.co.uk. 3:24:16 PM

The justice “system” exposed in Houston   DNA Lab's Woes Cast Doubt on 68 Prison Terms Forensic science at a Houston police unit was plagued by problems. The inmates for whom retesting is ordered include 17 on death row. By Lianne Hart, Times Staff Writer   HOUSTON -- In the exacting field of forensic science, the Houston Police Department's DNA crime lab was a mess.   Analysts botched simple tests. They misinterpreted data. They stored evidence in a room where the ceiling leaked so badly that, one stormy night, 34 DNA samples were destroyed.   "I have never seen such a collective bunch of incompetents in my life," said Dr. Elizabeth Johnson, former head of the DNA lab at the medical examiner's office in Harris County, which includes Houston. "They don't understand how the testing should be done or how it should be interpreted. None of them can think it through any better than the others. They just don't get it."   Widespread problems at the police lab — including a poorly trained staff and questionable methodology — were uncovered during an independent audit in December. The lab shut down in January, and the district attorney's office began a massive review of cases involving DNA work by police lab analysts. So far, prosecutors have ordered retesting in the cases of 68 prisoners, 17 of them on Texas' death row. 2:38:22 PM

This isn’t good I don’t blame the troops – I blame the self-serving politicians who put them in this hideous situation.   Iraqi Civilians Killed At Checkpoint The Iraqi van in which the civilians were traveling failed to stop as ordered, military officials say. From Associated Press WASHINGTON -- U.S. troops killed seven Iraqi women and children at a checkpoint today when the Iraqis' van would not stop as ordered, a military official said.   Two other civilians were wounded in the incident at a U.S. Army checkpoint on a highway near Najaf in southern Iraq, the official said. The military is investigating, he said.   The dead and wounded were among 13 women and children in a van that approached the checkpoint but did not stop, the official said. Soldiers fired warning shots and then shots into the vehicle's engine, neither of which stopped it, he said.   Four Army soldiers were killed at a checkpoint near Najaf Saturday by a car bomb detonated by an Iraqi soldier dressed as a civilian.   Meanwhile, fresh U.S. forces are flowing to the Persian Gulf, including 500 members of an Army cavalry regiment being sent ahead of schedule to help protect U.S. supply lines from Iraqi attack. 2:25:51 PM

War portends ugly occupation As noted by Mr. Webb below, none of this should have been a surprise… except that it didn’t jive with the Bush regime politicos, their ideological views, and their need to sell this unnecessary war.   Webb can’t be dismissed as a “bleeding-heart liberal” either. Check out his credentials below. And be sure to check out the last paragraph as well.   While our men and women are sacrificing daily in Iraq, help them out with some sacrifices here at home: take the time to protest the war both in marches and by writing your newspaper, your representative or favorite web-log. Try and make a difference to save those who are being sacrificed for a neo-con chicken-hawk ideology.   (thanks to intel dump)   The War in Iraq Turns Ugly. That's What Wars Do. By JAMES WEBB   ARLINGTON, Va. — This campaign was begun, like so many others throughout history, with lofty exhortations from battlefield commanders to their troops, urging courage, patience, compassion for the Iraqi people and even chivalry. Within a week it had degenerated into an unexpected ugliness in virtually every populated area where American and British forces have come under fire. Those who believed from intelligence reports and Pentagon war planners that the Iraqi people, and particularly those from the Shiite sections of the southeast, would rise up to greet them as liberators were instead faced with persistent resistance.   Near Basra, as The Financial Times reported, "soldiers were not being welcomed as liberators but often confronted with hatred." In the increasingly messy fights around Nasiriya, Marine units, which earlier were ambushed while responding to what appeared to be a large-scale surrender, had by the end of the week destroyed more than 200 homes.   Visions of cheering throngs welcoming them as liberators have vanished in the wake of a bloody engagement whose full casualties are still unknown. Snippets of news from Nasiriya give us a picture of chaotic guerrilla warfare, replete with hit-and-run ambushes, dead civilians, friendly fire casualties from firefights begun in the dead of night and a puzzling number of marines who are still unaccounted for. And long experience tells us that this sort of combat brings with it a "downstream" payback of animosity and revenge.   Other reports corroborate the direction that the war, as well as its aftermath, promises to take: Iraqi militiamen, in civilian clothes, firing weapons and disappearing inside the anonymity of the local populace. So-called civilians riding in buses to move toward contact. Enemy combatants mixing among women and children. Children firing weapons. Families threatened with death if a soldier does not fight. A wounded American soldier commenting, "If they're dressed as civilians, you don't know who is the enemy anymore."   These actions, while reprehensible, are nothing more than classic guerrilla warfare, no different in fact or in moral degree from what our troops faced in difficult areas of Vietnam. In the Fifth Marine Regiment area of operations outside Da Nang, we routinely faced enemy soldiers dressed in civilian clothes and even as women. Their normal routes of ingress and egress were through villages, and we fought daily in populated areas. On one occasion a smiling, waving girl — no more than 7 years old — lured a squad from my platoon into a vicious North Vietnamese crossfire. And if a Vietcong soldier surrendered, it was essential to remove his family members from their village by nightfall, or they might be killed for the sake of discipline.   The moral and tactical confusion that surrounds this type of warfare is enormous. It is also one reason that the Marine Corps took such heavy casualties in Vietnam, losing five times as many killed as in World War I, three times as many as in Korea and more total casualties than in World War II. Guerrilla resistance has already proved deadly in the Iraq war, and far more effective than the set-piece battles that thus far have taken place closer to Baghdad. A majority of American casualties at this point have been the result of guerrilla actions against Marine and Army forces in and around Nasiriya. As this form of warfare has unfolded, the real surprise is why anyone should have been surprised at all. But people have been, among them many who planned the war, many who are fighting it and a large percentage of the general population.   Why? Partly because of Iraq's poor performance in the 1991 gulf war, which caused many to underestimate Iraqi willingness to fight, while overlooking the distinction between retreating from conquered territory and defending one's native soil. And partly because protection of civilians has become such an important part of military training. But mostly, because the notion of fierce resistance cut against the grain of how this war was justified to the American people.   The strategies of both Iraq and the United States are only partly, some would say secondarily, military. The key strategic prize for American planners has always been the acceptance by Iraq's people of an invasion intended to change their government. If the Iraqis welcomed us, the logic goes, it would be difficult for those on the Arab street, as well as Americans and others who questioned the wisdom of the war, to condemn our presence.   Thus, throughout the buildup to war, the Iraqis were characterized to America — and to our military — as so brutally repressed by Saddam Hussein's regime that they would quickly rise up to overthrow him when the Americans arrived. This was clearly the expectation of many American fighting men as they crossed into Iraq. "Their determination was really a surprise to us all," said Brig. Gen. John Kelly of the Marines on Friday. "What we were really hoping for was just to go through and everyone would wave flags and all that."   On the other side, the Iraqi regime has used both its ancient history and American support of Israel in appealing to the nationalism of its people to resist an invasion by an outside power. It is as yet unclear which argument is succeeding, although early indications are that the American invasion has stirred up enormous animosity.   The initial bombing campaign was political, aimed at Iraqi leaders. The current effort appears to be increasingly strategic, designed to damage the Iraqi military's better units. After that, the next step is likely to be a series of conventional engagements matching American armored and infantry forces against Iraq's Republican Guard. The United States hopes to force Iraq into fixed-position warfare or even to draw them into a wild attack, where American technological superiority and air power might destroy Iraq's best fighting force.   But Iraq's leaders have reviewed their mistakes in the first gulf war and have also studied the American efforts in Somalia and Kosovo. They will most likely try to draw American units into closer quarters, forcing them to fight even armored battles in heavily populated areas nearer to Baghdad. This kind of fighting would be designed to drive up American casualties beyond the point of acceptability at home, and also to harden Iraqi resolve against the invaders.   If American forces are successful in these engagements, the war may be over sooner rather than later. But if these battles stagnate, guerrilla warfare could well become pandemic, not only in Baghdad but also across Iraq. And even considering the strong likelihood of an allied victory, it is hard to imagine an end point without an extremely difficult period of occupation.   In fact, what will be called an occupation may well end up looking like the images we have seen in places like Nasiriya. Do Iraqis hate Saddam Hussein's regime more deeply than they dislike the Americans who are invading their country? That question will still be with this administration, and the military forces inside Iraq, when the occupation begins, whether the war lasts a few more days or several more months.   Or worse, the early stages of an occupation could see acts of retribution against members of Saddam Hussein's regime, then quickly turn into yet another round of guerrilla warfare against American forces. This point was made chillingly clear a few days ago by the leader of Iraq's major Shiite opposition group, who, according to Reuters, promised armed resistance if the United States remains in Iraq after Saddam Hussein is overthrown.   Welcome to hell. Many of us lived it in another era. And don't expect it to get any better for a while.   James Webb, secretary of the Navy in the Reagan administration, was a Marine platoon and company commander in Vietnam. He is an author and filmmaker. 1:49:39 PM

Stalemate Will it come to the point where we have to destroy a city to “liberate” it?   Basra Residents Hold Out as Siege Drags On Mon March 31, 2003 11:48 AM ET   By Michael Georgy BASRA, Iraq (Reuters) - Shells pound Basra's crowded neighborhoods every night. British tanks rumble on the city's edge. Black smoke rises from oil pipelines while Iraqis watch their most precious commodity burn away.   But residents of Iraq's second city said they can withstand the U.S.-British siege for months, raising questions over how long the troops can stay on the outskirts before launching an offensive.   "It is really no problem for us. Basra is functioning normally. We feel some pressure but we can stay like this for a long time," said Ahmed, one city resident.   Allied troops had expected to sweep through southern Iraq in a war to topple Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. But they have found resistance tougher than expected.   U.S. and British troops control highways around Basra but they have not managed to penetrate the city despite aerial bombardment and artillery fire.   The siege has failed to break Basra residents, suggesting Iraqis are not about to capitalize on the presence of foreign troops and rise up against Saddam loyalists, a move that would normally mean certain death.   Basra is home to many of Iraq's Shiites, who say they have been persecuted and killed by Saddam's Baath party for decades.   So allied troops may have thought military pressure would spark an uprising after decades of fear.   But there are no signs of unrest here or other southern towns, where a Shiite revolt was crushed in the 1991 Gulf War after the Americans encouraged a rebellion and then left.   "Basra will only fall when Baghdad falls," said Ahmed Hassan. "There is no other way. The militias are still here, there are members of the army operating."   RESIDENTS STAY PUT   While some people have left the city, most residents have stayed put and say pro-Saddam militias are operating in Basra confidently or firing at U.S. and British troops from sprawling shanty towns around the city.   Hundreds of Iraqis in cars cross through checkpoints to leave Basra everyday. But they return a few hours later after visiting relatives in nearby towns.   Those who try to leave for more pressing reasons such as medical needs are often turned back, fueling the growing anger over British and U.S. troops, who have tightened security.   "If you don't let me through I will hate the Americans and British," said Adil Hussein, who was pleading with a British soldier to let him through to get treatment for an ulcer.   "We only treat victims of war wounds," he was told.   Basra's residents, meanwhile, carry on with life in a country which has suffered from three major wars since the 1980s.   After shells land, Basra residents leave their homes to survey the damage or predict where the next one will crash, one of the only ways to pass time in electricity blackouts.   When they are not shopping in bustling local markets or trading goods, Iraqis discuss skyrocketing vegetable prices. Others even make time for a drink, transporting boxes of whiskey across the Basra bridge.   Even if allied troops eventually capture Basra, its residents say any attempts to impose rulers favored by Washington or London will backfire.   "No way we will accept this. They think they can just come here and choose our leaders? That's when the machineguns will be all over the streets," said Muhammad. 12:44:13 PM

Something to keep in mind   Video suggests US hit useless decoys: analyst Iraqi aircraft destroyed by US bombs in video shown on Monday at the daily US briefing on the Iraq war looked like useless old decoys, British military analyst Paul Beaver said.   "I'm surprised that they would put this up on television when, to the trained eye, these were at least two or three generations old," the former publisher of Jane's Defence Weekly said.   Mr Beaver told BBC World television that the three aircraft shown exploding in black-and-white video shot by attacking US warplanes looked like an old British Hawker Hunter, an old Soviet-designed MiG and a newer but obsolescent Sukhoi.   The aircraft were sitting in the middle of runways, suggesting the Iraqis had put them out deliberately as decoys, Mr Beaver said.   The Hunter "was an aircraft that was in service when there was a kingdom of Iraq in the 1950s," he said.   A spokesman for US Central Command said "obviously, we thought they were targets to take out and we continue to take out targets that can erode the regime".   Decoys were used to great effect by Yugoslavia in the 1999 US-dominated bombing campaign by NATO forces to end the Kosovo crisis.   Battle damage studies after the war showed far fewer tanks and armoured vehicles were destroyed than claimed.   Iraq has kept its air force on the ground so far in the 12-day-old war.   The reason for that was "if they fly, they die", US Brigadier-General Vincent Brooks told reporters in Qatar.   12:14:12 PM

Hints of future wars to come? This just keeps getting better and better… Why don’t we have done with it and just declare war on all of Islam – BTW making bin Laden a visionary.   Now do they see why diplomacy and coalition building (the real thing, not the PR stuff they’ve put together ) are so important? Not likely …   In strong and accusatory language, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell called on Syria and Iran last night to stop supporting terrorists. He warned that Syria's leadership "faces a critical choice" and will be held responsible for help it gives to the government of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.   Powell became the second Cabinet secretary in three days to warn the two countries, which the United States considers state sponsors of terrorism. On Friday, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld charged that Syria is shipping military supplies across its border to Iraq, calling the move a hostile act.   "Syria can continue direct support for terrorist groups and the dying regime of Saddam Hussein, or it can embark on a different and more hopeful course," Powell said in an address to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. "Either way, Syria bears responsibility for its choices and for the consequences." 12:08:41 PM

Definite must-read If you read nothing else read this article in the New Yorker by Seymour Hersh (thanks to agonist). Here are some choice parts:   As the ground campaign against Saddam Hussein faltered last week, with attenuated supply lines and a lack of immediate reinforcements, there was anger in the Pentagon. Several senior war planners complained to me in interviews that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his inner circle of civilian advisers, who had been chiefly responsible for persuading President Bush to lead the country into war, had insisted on micromanaging the war’s operational details. Rumsfeld’s team took over crucial aspects of the day-to-day logistical planning—traditionally, an area in which the uniformed military excels—and Rumsfeld repeatedly overruled the senior Pentagon planners on the Joint Staff, the operating arm of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “He thought he knew better,” one senior planner said. “He was the decision-maker at every turn.”…   In early February, according to a senior Pentagon official, Rumsfeld appeared at the Army Commanders’ Conference, a biannual business and social gathering of all the four-star generals. Rumsfeld was invited to join the generals for dinner and make a speech. All went well, the official told me, until Rumsfeld, during a question-and-answer session, was asked about his personal involvement in the deployment of combat units, in some cases with only five or six days’ notice. To the astonishment and anger of the generals, Rumsfeld denied responsibility. “He said, ‘I wasn’t involved,’” the official said. “‘It was the Joint Staff.’”   “We thought it would be fence-mending, but it was a disaster,” the official said of the dinner. “Everybody knew he was looking at these deployment orders. And for him to blame it on the Joint Staff—” The official hesitated a moment, and then said, “It’s all about Rummy and the truth.”…   According to a dozen or so military men I spoke to, Rumsfeld simply failed to anticipate the consequences of protracted warfare. He put Army and Marine units in the field with few reserves and an insufficient number of tanks and other armored vehicles. (The military men say that the vehicles that they do have have been pushed too far and are malfunctioning.) Supply lines—inevitably, they say—have become overextended and vulnerable to attack, creating shortages of fuel, water, and ammunition. Pentagon officers spoke contemptuously of the Administration’s optimistic press briefings. “It’s a stalemate now,” the former intelligence official told me. “It’s going to remain one only if we can maintain our supply lines. The carriers are going to run out of jdams”—the satellite-guided bombs that have been striking targets in Baghdad and elsewhere with extraordinary accuracy. Much of the supply of Tomahawk guided missiles has been expended. “The Marines are worried as hell,” the former intelligence official went on. “They’re all committed, with no reserves, and they’ve never run the lavs”—light armored vehicles—“as long and as hard” as they have in Iraq. There are serious maintenance problems as well. “The only hope is that they can hold out until reinforcements come.”   The 4th Infantry Division—the Army’s most modern mechanized division—whose equipment spent weeks waiting in the Mediterranean before being diverted to the overtaxed American port in Kuwait, is not expected to be operational until the end of April. The 1st Cavalry Division, in Texas, is ready to ship out, the planner said, but by sea it will take twenty-three days to reach Kuwait. “All we have now is front-line positions,” the former intelligence official told me. “Everything else is missing.” 11:34:20 AM