And believe me, he knows his sh-t.
Here’s taste of what he has to say:
The war plan's excessive risk became clear in the postcombat stage, and here the US forces and capabilities were unequal to the task. It was the planners' job to have anticipated the various contingencies and to make adequate provision for them, including the possibility of postwar Iraqi resistance to US occupation.… The result, at the end of major combat, was a US force that was incapable of providing security, stopping the looting and sabotage, and establishing a credible presence throughout the country—even within Baghdad. The ensuing disorder vitiated some of the boost in US credibility that was won on the battlefield, and it opened the way for deeper and more organized resistance during the following weeks.…
The Bush administration has explained the situation in postwar Iraq as a matter of assumptions that hadn't quite worked out, "that tended to underestimate the problem." It apparently believed that removing Saddam would remove the Baath threat, that large numbers of military and police would rally to the Americans, and that Iraqi bureaucrats would stay on the job.
In fact, the lack of preparations was partly a consequence of the leadership and decision-making within the Bush administration and partly the result of deeper forces and tendencies at work within the US government and the US military.…
Clark’s article is an extremely detailed deconstruction of Bush blame shifting accomplished in a professional, indeed, clinical manner. If you really want to know what went wrong with the debacle in Iraq, and would like to get a flavor of a man who could set things to rights, then by all means read it in its entirety.
6:47:01 PM 
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