Friday, September 19, 2003

Clark: The Anti-War But Pro-War Resolution Candidate Yesterday Clark told a reporter for the New York Times that had he been in congress on October 11, he "probably would have voted for the resolution" giving the president authorization to go to war. This is being pounced on as an admission by Clark that he backed the war.  His press secretary Mary Jacoby encapsulated what she heard him say: "You said you would have voted for the resolution as leverage for a U.N.-based solution." "Right," General Clark responded. "Exactly." This is absolutely consistent with Clark's testimony to the Armed Services Committee on September 26, 2002: The United States diplomacy in the United Nations will be further strengthened if the Congress can adopt a resolution expressing US determination to act if the United Nations will not.The use of force must remain a US option under active consideration. The resolution need not at this point authorize the use of force, but simply agree on the intent to authorize the use of force, if other measures fail.[Emphasis Added.] The more focused the resolution on Iraq and the problem of weapons of mass destruction, the greater its utility in the United Nations. The more nearly unanimous the resolution, the greater its impact in the diplomatic efforts underway. The President and his national security team must deploy imagination, leverage, and patience in crafting UN engagement. In the near term, time is on our side, and we should endeavor to use the UN if at all possible. This may require a period of time for inspections or even the development of a more intrusive inspection program, if necessary backed by force.This is foremost an effort to gain world-wide legitimacy for US concerns and possible later action, but it may also impede Saddam’s weapons programs and further constrain his freedom of action. Yes, there is a risk that inspections would fail to provide the evidence of his weapons programs, but the difficulties of dealing with this outcome are more than offset by opportunity to gain allies and support in the campaign against Saddam. In October, when the resolution passed, polls showed American support for using the military to oust Hussein was over 60 percent, but 70 percent believed he should first get UN approval. Clark's statement that he would have supported the resolution to use as leverage for the UN is not inconsistent with the opinion of many at that time, although it's clear Clark would have preferred a resolution that threatened force without directly authorizing it.  The resolution was not a declaration of war. The United States Congress has not declared war since World War II. The resolution authorized the president to act with force if he deemed it necessary but fell far short of a war declaration. When Clark says he would have voted for the resolution but would not have voted for the war, he is saying he would not have voted for a congressional declaration of war and that he opposed the actions taken by the Bush administration under the shelter of the October resolution. These actions contradicted the case the administration made to win congressional support for the resolution, which was advertised as a platform to secure peace not authorize war.  Bush used the leverage argument to convince skeptical lawmakers to support the resolution even if they opposed war. In a September 19 photo-op in the Oval office, a reporter asked whether the resolution would authorize force. Bush responded "That will be part of the resolution, the authorization to use force. If you want to keep the peace, you've got to have the authorization to use force. But it's -- this will be -- this is a chance for Congress to indicate support. It's a chance for Congress to say, we support the administration's ability to keep the peace. That's what this is all about. " According to CBS, Powell reinforced the idea that the resolution was more to secure peace than to actually authorize war by telling lawmakers that "the Bush administration was unlikely to use force except if Iraq continued to refuse to get rid of weapons of mass destruction."  Few doubted Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons. During previous UN inspections, Iraq failed to provide evidence they had been destroyed. The belief that Hussein possessed chemical and biological agents was bolstered by intelligence some now believe was provided by Iraqi double agents posing as defectors.  Some, like Hans Blix, now speculate that Hussein may have believed the US would not attack if they were convinced he possessed such lethal weapons. After all, despite North Korea's continued claims that it possessed and would use nuclear weapons, the US declined to act against North Korea. The day before congress passed the war resolution, Time published Let's Wait to Attack, in which Clark calls for the US to consider public sentiment and expresses strong support only for multi-lateral action with a detailed post-conflict plan and only if the UN cannot resolve US concerns about whether Hussein possesses chemical and biological weapons. Clark never wavered in his belief that Hussein had chemical weapons, and said to Paula Zahn on April 2, 2003, "I think they will be found. There's so much intelligence on this."  Clark, however, was a civilian during the buildup to the Iraq war and received the same intelligence provided to the American people--intelligence that we now know was fraught with errors and omissions. What did waver was his faith in the president's stated determination to 'exhaust diplomacy' and work with the UN and US allies on Iraq. He also lacked conviction that the threat from Hussein was imminent enough to justify pre-emptive action, expressed to Global Viewpoint editor Nathan Gardels at the start of the war on March 19. In an April 4 London Times editorial, Clark crowed at the easy victory. "Liberation is at hand. Liberation-- the powerful balm that justifies painful sacrifice, erases lingering doubt and reinforces bold actions." He added "George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair should be proud of their resolve in the face of so much doubt." But remember, any opposition Clark had to the war was not because he disbelieved the case for WMD or harbored doubts that Hussein was a tyrant who deserved to be deposed. His opposition was predicated on the fact that Bush did not do enough to exhaust diplomacy and coordinate with the UN. Who is surprised that a career military man would rejoice at a successful outcome to the war, which resulted in few casualties for US troops? Indeed, weren't most Americans--even those opposed to the war--relieved that it was so swift and painless (at least to the US)? However, as evidence surfaces showing that both UK and US intelligence on weapons of mass destruction was hyped and that, as Rumsfeld stated to the Senate Armed Services Committee in July, "The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass murder," many who previously supported the war are now filled with doubt and have questions about whether it was justified. The poor planning for the aftermath of the war and the continued deaths of US servicemen and Iraqi civilians has compounded these doubts. Clark has never referred to himself as the anti-Iraq-war candidate, although he could have tried to do so to steal Dean's thunder. Instead, he has taken what can only be considered the tougher road. He acknowledges that he most likely would have voted for the resolution but with reservations, a position no different than the one expressed by Kerry and Gephardt and no different than the position held by the majority of Americans back in October 2002. Whether this should be held against him is for voters to decide, and they can consider General Clark's own words on his sentiments toward war, taken from a September 9, 2002, editorial in USA Today: "Our strategic priorities need to be kept in order: We can best face a possible fight against Iraq if we have strong allies and a weakened al-Qaeda. While we eventually may have to use force against Iraq, we should use our resolve first to empower diplomacy, with war as the last resort." It is difficult to fault those who supported the resolution as a means to secure cooperation from Hussein when the threat of force from the US was likely responsible for the unprecedented access Hussein gave the UN inspectors this go around. The proverbial 'fly in the ointment' was the Bush team. Before congress passed the resolution, the administration misled congress, America, and the UN into believing the US would allow the inspectors ample time to ferret out the truth concerning Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. With resolution in hand, the administration abandoned their promises and began the push for immediate action against Iraq. ***UPDATE: Clark confirms this blogger's assessment of his position in interview with Associated Press: "Let's make one thing real clear, I would never have voted for this war," Clark said before a speech at the University of Iowa. "I've gotten a very consistent record on this. There was no imminent threat. This was not a case of pre-emptive war. I would have voted for the right kind of leverage to get a diplomatic solution, an international solution to the challenge of Saddam Hussein." And later, to the Des Moines Register: "I would have voted for a resolution which gave the president leverage to seek a diplomatic, non-military solution to the problem in Iraq. I would have never voted for war," he said. "I'm a soldier. I know what war is like."*** 6:54:21 PM

In Defense of Clark Now that General (Ret.) Wesley Clark has announced his candidacy as a democratic contender for the title of president, conservatives have come out swinging. Many of these blows have been leveled below the belt, with a powerful amount of spin. Allegation #1: Clark nearly started WWIII while serving as NATO commander in Kosovo. This allegation is based on an account Clark writes about in Waging Modern War. Russian president Boris Yeltsin sent 200 Russian troops unannounced to the Pristina airport during the Kosovo conflict, intending to send thousands more. This move was met with critical response from NATO allies and the Russian press. Secretary William Cohen was quoted as saying it put the entire NATO operation at risk. According to Associated Press reports, in a congressional hearing on July 1, 1999, Senator Olympia Snowe (R) from Maine asked General Clark why the NATO forces had been caught off guard by the Russians at Pristina, to which Clark replied ``We weren't caught off guard,'' Clark said. NATO had a plan to get to the airport first, he disclosed. ``We were prepared to respond, but decisions were made at levels above mine not to.'' When Clark learned that the Russians were en route to the Pristina airport, he claims to have phoned NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, who told him he must beat the Russians to the airport. The Pristina Airport was to be a strategic location for NATO operations (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/671495.stm). When Clark gave the command to British Lt. General Sir Michael Jackson to send in a contingent of paratroopers and occupy the airport, Jackson responded "I'm not going to start World War III for you." The plan was dropped and the Russians grabbed the Pristina airport unopposed. The Washington Post reported on June 25, 1999, that the British even provided the 200 Russian troops with food because they did not fear such a small force and couldn't understand Clark's concern. According to the BBC report, produced after the incident, a senior Russian officer detailed how Russia had planned to send in thousands of troops to carve out its own sector of Kosovo independent of NATO control. Clearly that could have been a disaster and justifies Clark's rationale. Anticipating that the Russians would send aircraft, Clark ordered tanks to occupy the Pristina runways and prevent the Russians from landing, which Clark claims was on orders from the Pentagon. The British again opposed him, and Jackson's superior told Clark that Clark's US superiors disavowed the plan. Clark says he was surprised to hear that but when he contacted the officials back at the Pentagon they told him to drop the plan. Instead, he contacted Hungary and other US allies in the region and requested them to deny the Russians the right to use their airspace. The allies complied, and the Russians' plan to carve out a non-NATO sector for themselves in Kosovo was thwarted. Would Clark's plan to block the airways at Pristina have led to "WWIII"? Only if Yeltsin was incompetent. The tides had already turned for Milosevic, and clearly the US/NATO forces made far more valuable allies to Russia than Serbia. Perhaps it should be noted that Lt. General Michael Jackson has his own skeletons. In 1972, he was one of three British commanders present when troops opened fire on Irish protestors, killing 13. Blair convened a new tribunal on "Bloody Sunday" in 1998, and the investigation is ongoing. Recently discovered documents written by Jackson are being examined to see whether they constitute a coverup. Perhaps General Jackson's involvement in this disastrous event impacted his perception of the Russian situation, filling him with undue concern that the situation at Pristina could quickly escalate, mirroring the havoc of 'Bloody Sunday.' It is difficult to rationalize why he would have imagined Yeltsin would start WWIII over what was later referred to by NATO, the US, and Russia as a minor issue. One further comment for critics to consider. If the French had sent 200 troops unannounced to Baghdad Airport with plans to send thousands more during the middle of the Iraq War, what would have been the right thing for Franks to do about it? Allegation #2: Clark was fired. It appears true that Clark did not mesh well with the brass over at the Pentagon, particularly Defense Secretary Cohen. The New York Times addresses this today, quoting a book by David Halberstam. Halberstam alleges that the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Clinton they needed to find a position for Joe Ralston, an Air Force general and close associate to Cohen, who had been denied an earlier promotion to the Joint Chiefs for committing adultery. According to the article, these members falsely told Clinton that Clark's NATO assignment was already up and promoted Ralston as a replacement. Halberstam says "Clinton signed on, apparently not realizing that he had been snookered." Thus, Clark was 'retired' prior to the end of his stint as NATO commander. Clark wrote in his own account of the incident that Clinton later told him he had "nothing to do with it." Given the recent comments Clinton has made about Clark and that he subsequently awarded him the Presidential Medal of Freedom--the highest civilian honor--it seems unlikely Clinton held Clark in poor regard. Clark's difficulties with the Joint Chiefs and senior Pentagon officials are well-known. The Washington Post discusses them in a September 17 article. Ret. General Barry McCaffrey attributes the tension to the fact that Clark “...was way too bright, way too articulate, way too good looking and perceived to be way too wired to fit in with our culture. He was not one of the good ol’ boys.” Yet McCaffrey has high praise for Clark, stating "He is probably among the top five most talented I’ve met in my life. I think he is a national treasure who has a lot to offer the country.” In the same article, Army Colonel Douglas MacGregor says “There is this aspect of his character — he is loyal to people he knows are capable and competent.” “As for his peers, it’s a function of jealousy and envy, and it’s a case of misunderstanding. General Clark is an intense person, he’s passionate, and certainly the military is suspicious of people who are intense and passionate. He is a complex man who does not lend himself to simplistic formulations. But he is very competent, and devoted to the country.” It is telling to note that Clark's naysayers in this article remained anonymous. Allegation #3: Clark lied about the White House calling him on 9/11. Spinsanity does a great job of debunking this claim, made repeatedly by conservative commentators and supposedly objective reporters alike. Clark was explaining to Tim Russert on Meet the Press that some tried to make a connection between 9/11 and Hussein before the fires had even been extinguished. The red words in brackets have been added to illustrate where clarity could have been improved in the remarks: GEN. CLARK: I think it was an effort to convince the American people to do something, and I think there was an immediate determination right after 9/11 that Saddam Hussein was one of the keys to winning the war on terror. Whether it was the need just to strike out or whether he was a linchpin in this, there was a concerted effort during the fall of 2001 starting immediately after 9/11 to pin 9/11 and the terrorism problem on Saddam Hussein. MR. RUSSERT: By who? [sic] Who did that? [Who tried to link 9/11 and Hussein?] GEN. CLARK: Well, it came from the White House, it came from people around the White House. It came from all over. I [even] got a call [from someone] on 9/11. I was on CNN, and I got a call at my home saying, "You got to say this is connected. This is state-sponsored terrorism. This has to be connected to Saddam Hussein." I said, "But--I'm willing to say it but what's your evidence?" And I never got any evidence. And these [people who called] were people who had--Middle East think tanks and people like this and it was a lot of pressure to connect this and there were a lot of assumptions made. But I never personally saw the evidence and didn't talk to anybody who had the evidence to make that connection. The Spinsanity website points out what can easily be ascertained--nowhere does Clark allege that the White House made the phone call. After Paul Krugman wrote a July 15 editorial in the New York Times on this issue, Clark dispatched a letter July 17 to clarify the matter. The Times did not publish his letter until the end of August. Meanwhile, as the media did with Gore, they carped on this issue until it has now become accepted by the public as fact. Allegation #4: Clark was convicted of war crimes. This is true. Clark, along with former President Clinton, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, French President Jacques Chirac, and former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana were convicted in absentia in a Belgrade court for war crimes, including the deaths of 546 Yugoslavian soldiers, 504 civilians and 138 Serb policemen and sentenced to twenty years. Warrants have been issued for their arrest should they ever set foot in Belgrade. Milosevic's regime arranged the trial in its last days; the new Yugoslavian government says the verdict is an embarrassment. This is why the Bush administration and congress strongly oppose making US servicemen, military leaders and civilian leaders subject to international criminal courts. They fear these courts could be used as a political tool instead of a legitimate arbiter of justice. Although the UN has established checks and balances to prevent this, the US is unwilling to take its chances, perhaps because Bush could end up among the indicted. Allegation #5: Clark was responsible for burning down the Branch Davidian Compound at Waco. An organization called Counterpunch levies that charge here. By their own admission they have unearthed no evidence. They claim that Clark was commanding the Cavalry Division of the III Corps in Ft. Hood at the time and that Governor Ann Richards met with Clark's assistant commander, who subsequently met with the National Guard. They quote the government's investigation into the matter regarding two "senior officers" who traveled to DC and met with the Justice Department and the FBI. These men are not named in the report and Counterpunch says they could not unearth their identities, but they arbitrarily assume that one of the men was Clark. They make this assumption based on the dubious claim that the Waco onslaught, which utilized Division III tanks, resembles Clark's attacks on Milosevic in Kosovo coupled with a quote from one of the officers, who told Reno that if this were a foreign military operation, the focus would be to take out the leader. Regardless of the fact that the report found no wrongdoing by the US and concluded that the Branch Davidians were responsible for the fire, it is laughable to pin this on Clark merely because an unidentified military officer advocated taking out the leader first. Breaking the chain of command is typical military policy, as witnessed when the US bombed Gaddafhi's palace in Libya under Reagan and during the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, when bombs were dropped anywhere Omar, bin Laden or Hussein were believed to be hiding. _____________________________________________________ Got any more smears against General Wesley Clark in need of analysis? E-mail them to me. 12:49:38 PM