Friday, December 2, 2005

Fishy Science Thanks to scottp, comes this breaking news from New Scientist: Cannabis doubles the risk of fatal crashes. Now since all the reliable data I've found indicates that, while smoking pot while driving is a bad idea, it actually causes drivers to be cautious and is actually safer than driving while fatigued, or any of a host of other distractions. So the alarmist nature of this article aroused my curiosity, especially these statements: "These shocking results prove beyond doubt the dangers of drug-driving, and of mixing drink and drugs before getting behind the wheel," says Mary Williams, chief executive of Brake, the UK's national road safety charity. [read MADD] "We need to see the government doing targeted, prime-time TV advertising on the issue of drug-driving, and we ... need to see a national roll out of roadside drugs-testing by the police to catch drug-drivers before they kill or injure innocent road users." Whoa. Just what did this study discover? Let's look. I'm quoting extensively so you can get a real feel for the extent of this 'scientific reporting.' Cannabis almost doubles the risk of fatal car crashes, according to a new study, though smoking the drug is still far less risky than drink-driving, the researchers say. Stoned drivers were almost twice as likely to be involved in a fatal car crashes than abstemious drivers, according to a study of 10,748 fatal car crashes in France between 2001 and 2003. More than half of the drivers in the study themselves died as a result of their accidents and all the subjects were tested for drug and alcohol use after crashing. Even after accounting for factors such as the age of the drivers and the condition of the vehicle, the researchers conclude that cannabis caused a significant number of the fatalities, with 2.5% of the crashes directly attributed to cannabis use. Alcohol was the direct cause of about 29%. Using cannabis and alcohol together was 16 times more risky than driving with neither drug in their body. "You are more likely to be involved in a crash, probably because of the drug's effect on your reaction times and concentration," says Jean-Louis Martin who carried out the research at the Univeristé Claude Bernard in Lyon, France. "But the drug also makes you more vulnerable to the effects of the crash, so you are more likely to die." The study did not explore why cannabis smokers fair less well in a crash. There are so many questionable assumptions in this piece that I have absolutely no idea whether there is a lick of real science involved. I do see that cannabis is somehow "responsible" for 2.5% versus 29.0% for alcohol, which certainly doesn't make cannabis look very bad. And the "more vulnerable to the effects of the crash" stuff? -- WTF?? If anybody can track down an English version of the actual research or an abstract from it, please let me know. I have a feeling that we'll be seeing this quoted by prohibitionists without them having a clue to the actual methodology, and I want to be prepared. Update: Thanks to everyone who tracked down information. I've spent some time reading the study, and I lack the skills to completely parse everything in it. There were, however, a couple of questionable assumptions used. For example, the study assumes that the prevalence of cannabis use within the overall driving population could be accurately represented by analyzing those drivers involved in minor injury crashes (and this is critical to forming an odds analysis of responsibility). I'm not so sure that it's a reasonable assumption. Additionally, I question some of the decisions used in determining responsibility for fatal crashes, and groups excluded. 2:10:37 PM |  drug policy | Links | permalink | comment []

DEA - business as usual Back in August, I mentioned the case of Essam Magid, a DEA informant that the agency continued to use after the FBI dismissed him for revealing his undercover status and identifying two agents. Today, the LA Times has a four-page story: Snagging a Rogue Snitch. It's a stark look at how the DEA operates. Using questionable informants who frame innocent victims while living high on DEA cash. And then DEA agents lie in court to protect their snitches. Fortunately, one Judge wasn't going along: U.S. District Court Judge Charles R. Breyer was listening closely. In an earlier hearing before the judge, FBI agent Pifer testified that she had explained to [DEA Agent Dwayne] Bareng the reasons why the FBI had stopped using Magid in 2002. Breyer testily pointed out the discrepancy in the two versions. After a break, Bareng got back on the stand and changed his story. Pifer had told him the reason for the firing, he said. Furthermore, Bareng acknowledged, he had discussed the matter with Magid as well as with his DEA supervisor. Now Breyer was angry. Breyer: "So the fact that an informant comes in, lies to the FBI, you find out about it, Magid comes and tells you that he lied to the FBI -- that's just nowhere in the DEA records; is that right? And you had conversations with the DEA and there are no records of that; is that right?" Bareng: "That's correct." The judge had heard enough. He suggested that Bareng, his supervisor and maybe others had relied knowingly on a "lawless" informant "who has been chastised by the government, who has been fired for it." More than that, Bareng may have perjured himself, Breyer told prosecutors. In a rare scene, Bareng soon invoked his 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination and asked for a lawyer. Within minutes, Hunter, the assistant U.S. attorney, was passed a note from her superiors: The government moved to dismiss the case against Ismael. That might have been the end of it all, but the judge wasn't done. Because witness misconduct and potential perjury had occurred in a case before his court, Breyer said he was compelled to call for an investigation. The probe, which is being conducted by the inspector general's office and federal prosecutors from San Diego, is centered on Magid's possible obstruction of justice. Investigators are also exploring whether Bareng lied in court about the DEA's knowledge of Magid's reckless behavior, whether the agent encouraged some of that conduct and how much his higher-ups knew. Time for the DEA to pay up for lawless behavior. Note: This is a problem that goes all the way up to the top. I wrote some time ago about Deputy DEA Director Michele Leonhart and her questionable connections with super-snitch Andrew Chambers. [Thanks to jackl for the tip.] 10:17:18 AM |  drug policy | Links | permalink | comment []

Wishful Drug-Warrior Thinking Walters and the other prohibitionists have been bragging recently about a recent spike in the street price of cocaine. CATO's Ted Galen Carpenter, writing at NRO, stuffs that spike down their throat: f you had received a dollar every time a U.S. government official announced that victory was near at hand in the war on drugs, you would be a rich person. [...] Carpenter uses Walter's numbers against him to demonstrate that the claims are baseless. For the past twelve years, street prices of cocaine have fluctuated between $120 and $190 per gram. Clearly, a price of $170 is well within that "normal" range. Indeed, the price of cocaine has fluctuated 19 percent or more -- both up and down -- many times during the twelve-year period. The latest fluctuation is nothing to get excited about. If one examines the price trend over a longer period, the "achievement" is even less impressive. During the early 1980s, cocaine sold for more than $500 per gram. The long-term trend has clearly been toward lower prices, suggesting that the supply of cocaine has become more plentiful. In conclusion, Carpenter takes on the entire philosophy of the drug warrior: The reality is that a supply-side strategy of drug prohibition cannot produce a worthwhile result. If it fails and drug supplies remain plentiful, it is a waste of time and money. If it "succeeds" and creates a supply shortage and a resulting price spike, it drives addicts into lives of greater and greater criminal behavior. One would be hard-pressed to come up with a better definition of an inherently bankrupt policy. That last is a very interesting point, which is often overlooked. The one caveat I'd add, is that while I agree with Carpenter's conclusion -- including, to a degree, the likely results if the supply side strategy of drug prohibition "succeeds" -- I've seen no evidence to suggest that it is possilble for such a strategy to succeed. 8:10:54 AM |  drug policy | Links | permalink | comment []