Cheney gets Shanked. My first reaction on seeing this staring up at me today from A1

Contacts between Iraqi intelligence agents and Osama bin Laden when he was in Sudan in the mid-1990's were part of a broad effort by Baghdad to work with organizations opposing the Saudi ruling family, according to a newly disclosed document obtained by the Americans in Iraq.

was to set up a howl: Just how far will the Times go to whore itself to Dick Cheney's PR agenda? On a more careful read, though—and surprised as I am by my own conclusion—I have little doubt that Cheney will see Thom Shanker's article ("Iraqis, Seeking Foes of Saudis, Contacted bin Laden, File Says"), in spite of the direction its headline seems to point, as a middle finger thrust firmly if discreetly in his face.

Shanker is extremely careful—with a degree of transparency rare in this sort of article—to document the known knowns and the known unknowns—evidence, perhaps, of an embarrassed consciousness on the part of the Times over its recent history of "insufficient skepticism" toward Iraq-related intelligence:

The new document, which appears to have circulated only since April, was provided to The New York Times several weeks ago, before the commission's report was released. Since obtaining the document, The Times has interviewed several military, intelligence and United States government officials in Washington and Baghdad to determine that the government considered it authentic.

The Americans confirmed that they had obtained the document from the Iraqi National Congress, as part of a trove that the group gathered after the fall of Saddam Hussein's government last year. The Defense Intelligence Agency paid the Iraqi National Congress for documents and other information until recently, when the group and its leader, Ahmad Chalabi, fell out of favor in Washington.

Some of the intelligence provided by the group is now wholly discredited, although officials have called some of the documents it helped to obtain useful.

Translation: We know all about what INC-provided intelligence is worth on its face. And no, this isn't the alleged Zarqawi memo either. We took our own sweet time making sure we had reason to believe this one was real.

The document—which Shanker is at pains to stress is a single document only—is said to be an internal Iraqi intelligence report "detailing efforts to seek cooperation with several Saudi opposition groups, including Mr. bin Laden's organization," at a time when bin Laden was based in Sudan, "before Al Qaeda had become a full-fledged terrorist organization." [From the second graf. Notice the precision with which Shanker limits the possibility that the Iraqi contact would have had anything to do with specifically American interests, or with terrorism, which at the time of the contact was still just a gleam in bin Laden's eye.]

The document states that Iraq agreed to rebroadcast anti-Saudi propaganda, and that a request from Mr. bin Laden to begin joint operations against foreign forces in Saudi Arabia went unanswered. There is no further indication of collaboration.

Last week, the independent commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks addressed the known contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda, which have been cited by the White House as evidence of a close relationship between the two.

The commission concluded that the contacts had not demonstrated "a collaborative relationship" between Iraq and Al Qaeda. The Bush administration responded that there was considerable evidence of ties.

See the finger sticking up there? "No further indication of collaboration" (Shanker) = "no collaborative relationship" (9/11 commission staff). [It turns out, as Shanker notes later in the piece, that even the Pentagon task force reviewing the document "said it described no formal alliance between" bin laden and the Iraqis.] And fuck you very much, Mr. Cheney.

The key first few graphs are written almost as a tease—Shanker baits his lead with what looks, at a glance, like a nice fat piece of Iraq-Al Qaeda evidence, and then, yikes, the "no collaboration" hook! Not quite convinced that's the story here? Take a look at the article's final passage, where Shanker returns to the Cheney-fomented controversy over what kind of relationship to Al Qaeda, if any, can be attributed to Saddam's intelligence service.

The document provides evidence of communications between Mr. bin Laden and Iraqi intelligence, similar to that described in the Sept. 11 staff report released last week. "Bin Laden also explored possible cooperation with Iraq during his time in Sudan, despite his opposition to Hussein's secular regime," the Sept. 11 commission report stated. The Sudanese government, the commission report added, "arranged for contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda."

"A senior Iraqi intelligence officer reportedly made three visits to Sudan," it said, "finally meeting bin Laden in 1994. Bin Laden is said to have requested space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but Iraq apparently never responded." The Sept. 11 commission statement said there were reports of further contacts with Iraqi intelligence in Afghanistan after Mr. bin Laden's departure from Sudan, "but they do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative relationship," it added.

After the Sept. 11 commission released its staff reports last week, President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney said they remained convinced that Mr. Hussein's government had a long history of ties to Al Qaeda. "This administration never said that the 9/11 attacks were orchestrated between Saddam and Al Qaeda," Mr. Bush said. "We did say there were numerous contacts between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda. For example, Iraqi intelligence officers met with bin Laden, the head of Al Qaeda, in the Sudan. There's numerous contacts between the two."

Shanker says it's "not clear whether the commission knew of this document" before the staff report was released, then goes on to note Cheney's insinuation that he "might have been privy to more information than the commission had" on the topic.

So let's parse this. Shanker says it's "unclear" whether the document was seen by the commission. (Again, very careful phrasing.) But his discussion, circumspect as it is, indicates pretty clearly that he believes the document forms a basis for the narrative of the Sudan contact contained in the staff report. And further, that he thinks it similarly forms the basis for Bush's statement about a Sudan meeting. (And fuck you very much, too, Mr. Bush.) When Shanker cites Cheney, as he does next, the between-the-lines implication is that in this case at least (evidently the strongest and most specific they've adduced) the claim that the White House has intelligence on Iraq-Al Qaeda links unavailable to the 9/11 commission is bunk, pure and simple.

Shanker won't say how the document came into his hands. Based on what he does with it, though, and considering the timing, I have to think that it came to him from someone allied with the 9/11 commission staff—someone at a strategic remove, so that Shanker would be unable to say with certainty whether the document could be traced back to the commission. Who else would have had a motive that works in this direction? Being able to guess at the stink the White House would try to throw around the "no collaborative relationship" conclusion, what better play than to leak a key document in establishing that conclusion to the Times, as a form of prophylaxis?