I'm not going to write anything substantial about Condi's testimony.  In brief, she didn't say anything new, she obfuscated per the usual, she followed the administration's "It's impossible that the Bush Admininstration could make an error" line and she lied.  If you want to read some majorly damning stuff about it, I suggest the Center for American Progress, who shreds her like cheddar cheese.  They address the lies and half-truths in her opening statement here, and in the question and answer session here. 

I can't improve on CAP's work.

11:02:11 AM    comment []

It's my strong opinion that the most solid op-ed columnist out there today is David Ignatius of the Washington Post.  I should be clear about this:  Ignatius is not my favorite columnist--that is definitely Paul Krugman.  I always agree with Krugman, but I surely must acknowledge the strength of his political leanings (which don't make him wrong, of course).  But Ignatius is studiously non-partisan, and he really, really knows his business.  His op-eds on foreign policy are smart, fair, and informative.

Today's column is particularly informative.  Ignatius offers some excellent policy prescriptions for Iraq, with coherent logic for them.  He strongly criticizes the current crackdown and the general handling of Iraq, as you can see:

The Americans eventually decided to break Sadr's power now, rather than wait for the scheduled transfer of sovereignty June 30. Policymakers believed that they would have the quiet support of Shiite Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and that most Iraqis would welcome a crackdown. Those assumptions were risky -- hopeful guesses at best. But even if they had been right, it was unwise to attack Sadr's militia the same week U.S. forces were rightly pounding the Sunni resistance in Fallujah after the grisly murder of four Americans there. Rather than enhancing the rule of law, the Sadr crackdown added to Iraq's chaos.

The unintended result was that America finally brought Shiites and Sunnis together -- in opposing occupation.

The U.S. mission in Iraq has been unraveling for months, and its problems result from mistakes and misunderstandings that predate the war. Fundamentally, they reflect the contradiction between America's proclaimed desire to create a sovereign Iraq and its failure to tap the indigenous political roots on which a strong Iraqi government must be built.

The italics are mine.  Read Ignatius' column--it's excellent, emphasizing the importance of self-rule by Iraqis, and the critical issue of goodwill--which we are squandering very, very quickly.

But let's discuss those italics.

One of the biggest concerns for the USG as well as followers of Iraq's development has been that the Shia and the Sunni would be unable to cooperate.  Given that Saddam routinely put down the majority Shiite populations, the situation looked to be unbearably complex, with the Shia requesting leadership and the Sunni unwilling to relinquish it.  Civil war has been mentioned more than once.

But now, it looks like Sunni and Shia are cooperating against us.  Must read article in the NYT today focuses on this.  There are two really critical paragraphs:

According to several militia members, many Shiite fighters are streaming into Falluja to help Sunni insurgents repel a punishing assault by United States marines. Groups of young men with guns are taking buses from Shiite neighborhoods in Baghdad to the outskirts of Falluja, and then slipping past checkpoints to join the action. "It's not easy to get in, but we have our ways," said Ahmed Jumar, a 25-year-old professional soccer player who also belongs to a Shiite militia. "Our different battles have turned into one fight, the fight against the Americans."

That's pretty unbelievable.  The rift between Shia and Sunni is no small matter, and for them to unify under one Anti-American banner suggests something critical:  the depth of resentment toward the US is staggering.  Militarily speaking, tactically speaking, it's an unqualified disaster for us.

Then there's this.

American leaders had been concerned that the rival sectarian groups would not find a common cause. Now, it seems, they have found a common enemy. "The danger is we believe there is a linkage that may be occurring at the very lowest levels between the Sunni and the Shia," Lt. General Ricardo Sanchez, commander of the occupation forces, said on Thursday. "We have to work very hard to ensure that it remains at the tactical level."

Nothing could possibly make it more clear that the situation in Iraq is hopelessly complex, and possibly just flat out hopeless.  Acknowledging the danger of the situation, General Sanchez believes we have to keep Sunni and Shia apart.  And for the purposes of quelling an uprising, this is undeniable.

Yet it is also undeniable that Shiite and Sunni factions have to be at least partially unified in order for democracy to really take hold in Iraq.  We have to want them to stay split in order to keep the uprising under control, but unified in the name of Iraq.  It's a very, very fine line. 

Is there any hope here?  I don't see it, though I fully acknowledge that I'm not an expert.  How can this end well?  Ignatius has some positive suggestions for managing the situation, but those still leave a ton of open-ended questions. 

Is it possible to regain the goodwill of Iraqis?  Isn't that the core of it, after all--how to regain goodwill, if we ever had it?  As long as Shiite and Sunni factions are unified in only one way--opposition to the United States--how can we have hope for Iraq?

10:21:31 AM    comment []