Guest writing today from someone who actually knows what they're talking about.  I give you Dr. Brian Efird.

From Bad to Worse in Iraq

First let me say thanks to Jim for the chance to air my views on his blog. I have been following the situation in Iraq for some time now (as I know most of his readers are also following it). Unlike most casual observers, I have been using a modeling technology to simulate the situation in Iraq since October 2002. I won’t belabor Jim’s readers with the details on how this methodology works, but will simply say it is an agent-based modeling approach. It assumes that the stakeholders (individuals and groups) in a political environment are rational actors, and draws on algorithms from game theory and spatial modeling to simulate the interactions between all stakeholders who influence Iraq’s stability (Iraqi, regional, non-governmental, and international stakeholders). This allows the user of this methodology to make specific forecasts about what will happen in a political situation. The CIA has done the most comprehensive external audit of the accuracy of this methodology, and they concluded that its forecasts are accurate in excess of 90% of the time.

Things are ugly in Iraq. And the current simulations suggest that the situation will get even worse, from the perspective of the US. Without a change in the approach toward different constituencies in Iraq, it will become increasingly difficult for the US-led "coalition" to consolidate support for a new regime. Terrorist-like activities are likely to continue and escalate.

If you’ll permit me, I’d like to share three pictures of the current and future situation in Iraq. These pictures provide a summary of the simulations provided by the methodology I just described. They track the way stakeholders’ advocated positions will change over time. The first two pictures are based on simulations from October 2003, but are still relevant today as they continue to track events going forward.

The first picture evaluates the situation in Iraq by anticipating position shifts of stakeholders. The vertical axis indicates the position each stakeholder is predicted to take regarding the new regime in Iraq. Higher points on the figure indicate increasing opposition to US activity in Iraq, middle points on the figure indicate indifference toward the US operations, and lower points on the figure indicate increasing support for US operations. The horizontal axis provides the methodology’s forecast of how each stakeholder will change their position regarding their support for US actions. The first picture focuses on changes in the remnants of the military factions in Iraq. The second will focus on civil society. The methodology actually tracks the positions of many more stakeholders.

Under current policy, the military situation is expected to deteriorate. Each line in Figure 1 tracks the forecasted change in positions of each stakeholder over time. Since this forecast was made in October of last year, I have marked April 2004 on the figure. Note that things continue to deteriorate as we go forward. For example, at the top of this figure, to the extent that Saddam’s inner circle (the ISS and SSO) can still influence the choice of regimes in Iraq, they will not shift off of their opposition to US actions.

Lower on the figure, the military elite is expected to continue embolden its pressure against the US presence. Former Republican Guard members and remnants of the officer core of the army will join the Tikriti and former Internal Security groups committed to oppose US presence. Thus, terrorist activities with support from reasonably well-trained groups are expected to increase with an expanded base of operations.

Regular army recruits can be persuaded to advance the positions held by the United States. These former foot soldiers are willing to join the US effort if an effective offer that provides them support is made in the near future. Over time, if Army recruits remain frustrated with US actions, they are also likely to swing and support the resistance. This would create an even larger threat to US presence in Iraq than faced currently.

The situation in Iraqi civil society is also expected to deteriorate as shown in the second picture below.

This figure simulates the anticipated position shifts of Iraq’s political stakeholders. Again, each line on this figure tracks the forecasted change in position of each stakeholder over time. Once more, since this forecast was made in October of last year and I have marked April 2003 in red.

Despite their unpleasant past, low-level members of the Baath Party bureaucrats are reluctant to join other opposition groups and are willing to buttress US activities and become useful in a new Iraqi administration. They are the best hope for organizing a government infrastructure.

The Sunnis, as well as Shiite religious leaders, which initially provided support for US presence, are likely to defect and oppose continued US activity in Iraq. Southern Shiites were expected to initially provide broad support for US operations, but as we have just seen, are antagonized by the US occupation and become dangerous opponents. Note that the October forecast accurately predicted the timing of the current Shiite defection.

The remaining Shiite religious leaders will soon follow in withdrawing their support for US-led nation-building efforts. The prospect for open internal war is very high and imminent. There does not appear to be much hope for an improvement. Without a change in the US approach to Iraq, a variety of civil groups will increasingly support terrorist actions directed against US and coalition forces.

Continued US military presence at current levels provides Iraqi opposition groups with the credibility needed to escalate resistance to a Western-oriented regime. Disparate groups who ordinarily would have different interests mobilize against a common foe.

One possibility I simulated was the impact of changing the force structure in Iraq to see if it makes a difference. The short answer is that maintenance of the current level of military presence, as well as either minor reductions or increases, will continue to foster dissatisfaction within Iraq and undermine an effective transition to a peaceful Iraq. Continued terrorist-like attacks are anticipated against US troops under the current course.

Dramatic increases in US troop levels would allow the US to impose compliance with its current peace plan. However, this increase in military presence would need to be dispersed throughout Iraq and comprehensive in nature. The intent of enhancing military presence should be strict enforcement of US policy and security for US forces. Given the size of Iraq and the number of dissatisfied individuals, such an increase in military presence would have to very significant.

Dramatic reductions in US troop levels may also promote stability within Iraq and minimize dissent by Iraq groups. If Iraqis are faced with direct responsibility for governance they are expected to reduce the pattern of conflict escalation, diminish terrorist activities and enhance the support for the emergence of a Western-oriented government in Iraq. However, total withdrawal of US troops would not be productive. Minimal US presence is necessary to ensure the safety of minority Iraqi groups as the process of Iraqi self-determination evolves. The consequences of these two options are illustrated in the next picture based on the methodology’s calculations.